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8.1 Introduction
The idea that injustice can impair not only those who are worse off but 
also those who are better off is widespread and far from new. There is 
a fairly commonplace idea, for example, that being born into money 
risks making you spoiled, selfish, and lazy. Theorists, especially femi-
nists and critical race theorists, have also argued that the better off lose 
out in many ways, due to the injustices that favor them overall. Marilyn 
Frye’s (2000) well-known analogy compares the oppression of women to 
a birdcage—if you focus only on one bar, it may not be clear that women 
are trapped within an overarching structure. The structure favors men 
and oppresses women, although the bars of the cage can create barri-
ers for men too; they are denied nurturing roles, for example. Consider 
also Charles Mills (2007) on how whiteness implies ignorance: white 
Americans must maintain distorted cognitive practices in the face of vast 
racial injustice and the undeserved advantages of whiteness. The igno-
rance of the privileged helps to protect unjust systems and thus privilege, 
as I will explain in Section 8.2, but it is nevertheless, pro tanto, harmful 
for the privileged. While injustice can be bad for those who are better 
off, similarly, justice can be good not only for the oppressed but also for 
the privileged. An example is Paolo Freire’s (1996, 25–33) claims that 
liberation from oppression will be freeing for the oppressor as well as the 
oppressed because both the oppressed and the oppressor are trapped in a 
relationship of dehumanization.1
I will refer to the ways in which being better off is bad for you as the 
impairments associated with privilege or, for short, “the impairments 
of privilege.” Although the idea that being privileged can impair the 
privileged is not unusual, many theories of justice tend to ignore it, let 
alone unpack and assess it in detail. In this chapter, I aim to identify and 
systematize impairments of privilege and to evaluate their implications 
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for two theories in political philosophy. I argue that relational egalitar-
ianism has the theoretical resources to identify and address the prob-
lems associated with the impairments of privilege, whereas distributive 
egalitarianism does not. Furthermore, assessment of the impairments of 
privilege helps us to identify, in part, how to achieve a society of rela-
tional equals.
While there are numerous criticisms of distributive egalitarianism, my 
chapter makes a contribution to the literature by focusing on how priv-
ilege is delineated. In order to do so, I bring literature on oppression to 
bear on literature about distributive justice.
Focusing on privilege may seem like a morally perverse shift in atten-
tion from the oppressed to the privileged, which would only reinforce 
injustice. I recognize that we need to be cautious about exploring the 
impairments of privilege. Claiming that there are impairments of privi-
lege does not imply that the degree of harm to those who are privileged 
comes anywhere near the harm to those who are oppressed. The impair-
ments of privilege are barely perceptible in comparison to the trauma, 
violence, and brutality of much oppression. We can still recognize, 
however, that such impairment exists without downplaying the damage 
caused to the oppressed. Furthermore, while we should not centralize 
the experiences of the privileged for their own sake, instrumentally we 
may need to tackle aspects of their experiences in order to bring about 
justice for the oppressed. As I will highlight, a number of the impair-
ments of privilege are functional for maintaining injustice, and these 
should be tackled in order to bring about a society of equals.
8.2 The Impairments of Privilege
The impairments of privilege refer to damage done to the privileged 
by the same unjust system that privileges them, and through many of 
the same mechanisms. Who are the privileged? Thus far I have referred 
to both the “better off’” and the “privileged.” While I recognize that 
these terms are often distinguished, and that even the same term can be 
conceived of in different ways, preliminarily I will use a broad sense of 
privilege that considers them to be equivalent.2 Being privileged means 
being at the top of a social hierarchy, or it can indicate having a greater 
amount of the social goods significant for social justice, e.g. resources or 
capabilities. I use this broad understanding so that my claims about priv-
ilege are judged as unjust by both relational and distributive approaches. 
(see sections 8.3 and 8.4 for more details).
I will primarily consider two sets of socially constructed groups in the 
US, the first being women and men (take this to include girls and boys) 
and the second being people of color and white people.3 Both distrib-
utive and relational approaches would claim that men and whites are 
better off than women and people of color, respectively, all other things 
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being equal; men and whites are thus privileged social groups which-
ever approach is chosen. The underlying unjust social structures that 
determine privilege in these cases are patriarchy and white supremacy.4 
Injustices of gender and race are multiple, systematic, and structural (as 
well as interpersonal).5 Another way to describe them is to say that they 
are examples of oppression. People suffer oppression as members of one 
or more oppressed groups.6 I will thus refer to the correlate group—the 
group who has less—as “the oppressed.” I take oppression to be one of 
the most egregious forms of social injustice, but it does not exhaust the 
notion.
Frequently an individual could fall into both the categories of “the 
privileged” and “the oppressed” according to the different social groups 
to which they belong—e.g. a white woman will experience the privileges 
of being white, but also experience oppression as a woman. However, 
this way of understanding the interaction of social identities has impor-
tant limitations, as Black feminists particularly have emphasized (e.g. 
Crenshaw 1989; hooks 1981). Oppressed social groups frequently cannot 
have their identities neatly segmented into axes of privilege, on the one 
hand, and those of oppression, on the other. For example, while being 
a Black man in the US may hold certain privileges over Black women, 
Black men experience suspicion, state violence, and mass incarceration 
not merely because of their race but also their gender, and thus being a 
Black man constitutes a specific form of oppression, which should not 
be downplayed by separating their identities merely according to “male 
privilege” and “racial oppression.”7 For this reason, when I refer to male 
privilege, I will refer to “many men” rather than merely “men.” This is 
clunky but necessary to acknowledge that in some of the examples of 
patriarchy, not all men are included, and that “all other things being 
equal,” qualifications will not suffice to recognize this compounded 
oppression.8
I identify six kinds of impairment: epistemic; evaluative; emotional; 
health-related; affiliative; and moral.9 Many examples of these kinds 
of impairment are functional. Functional impairments are damaging 
for the privileged; however, they are also functional for injustice. They 
function to maintain the overall unjust social system which maintains 
the privilege of the privileged. In the final section, I will argue that it 
is particularly ethically urgent to recognize the functional aspects of 
impairments, which is why I highlight a number of examples of how 
impairments can be functional below.
8.2.1 Epistemic Impairment
This refers to the damage the privileged experience as knowers, and espe-
cially to the ignorance associated with privilege; “all privilege is ignorant 
at the core,” Adrienne Rich claimed (Sholock 2012, 705). In feminist 
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epistemology, standpoint theory has emphasized that the oppressed 
often have more knowledge and a better understanding of the social 
order, especially but not exclusively of its injustices, than the privileged 
do (see e.g. Harding 1991 on the epistemic advantage that women have 
over many men). Similarly, epistemologies of ignorance have emphasized 
that the privileged are often ignorant; Mills (2007), for example, has 
argued that whites, as a dominant social group, have systematic epis-
temic practices that warp their knowledge about race, human nature, 
social norms, and desert.
Medina (2012) divides the ignorance associated with gender and 
racial injustice into two forms—ignorance about the social order and 
ignorance about self. Yancy (2016, xi–xxvvii) describes the latter form 
of ignorance in white supremacist societies when he claims that white 
people “don’t know who they are” (xv [his emphasis]), often believing 
the ideologies that help to explain and justify their privilege—such as, 
for example, that they have privilege because they merit it—and believ-
ing that they are independent and self-made when they are very much 
shaped by racist history and contemporary racist norms.
Furthermore, Medina (2012, 30–40) claims that the privileged tend 
to suffer from a number of epistemic vices that help constitute their 
ignorance: arrogance, laziness, and close-mindedness. These are epis-
temic, he claims, because “they affect one’s capacity to learn from oth-
ers and from the facts; they inhibit the capacity of self-correction and 
of being open to corrections from others” (31). While these vices fit 
well under the heading of epistemic impairment, they point to an addi-
tional type of impairment, moral impairment, discussed below. While 
everyone then—the privileged and the oppressed—is shaped by the 
unjust system, the privileged are less likely to recognize that they are 
so shaped.10
Epistemic ignorance is a functional impairment because it helps to 
protect the privileged (see e.g. Mills 2007; Pohlhaus 2012). For exam-
ple, it can protect them from experiencing cognitive dissonance at the 
unfairness of the social system and distress in light of their responsibility 
for it. Furthermore, this impairment makes it less likely that they will 
be motivated to change the system, which serves to protect their place in 
it. While this kind of ignorance plays a functional role, it is not in and 
of itself positive. Being ignorant is bad, at least pro tanto, even if it also 
has positive effects for the privileged, and hence, the ignorance that goes 
with privilege is an impairment of privilege.11
8.2.2 Evaluative Impairment
This form of damage has to do with what the privileged are likely to 
value and disvalue. Being oppressed risks distorting one’s conception of 
the good (e.g. Kernohan 1998). For example, if you are conditioned to 
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thinking that women are less likely to be able to do certain jobs, then 
you may, as a woman, have lower expectations for yourself. Privilege 
can also distort one’s conception of the good by devaluing certain signif-
icant ways of being and living. For example, for many men in patriarchy, 
being a caregiver, such as a nurse or a full-time dad, is discouraged and 
stigmatized. Having a rich emotional life, close, trustworthy, and vul-
nerable-making relationships, and a sense of closeness with community, 
may also be devalued, in favor of stoicism, power, self-sufficiency, and 
exaggerated self-confidence (see further discussions of these examples 
under “emotional” and “affiliative” impairment).
These men lose out on seeing the value of certain conceptions of the 
good and developing certain virtues. Hence they have an impairment 
of privilege; indeed, we can go further and say they are unable to see 
the value of certain ways of living that are superior to their alternatives, 
e.g. that it is better to have close, trustworthy, and vulnerable-making 
relationships than not because it promotes flourishing. Also, it seems 
evident that participating in hands-on and sustained caregiving of one’s 
children, while it has its challenges and disadvantages, makes one a bet-
ter parent and is more likely to promote healthy relationships with one’s 
children.
These kinds of devaluations thus make it more likely that many ways 
of living are closed off to the privileged. Evaluative impairment will 
have consequences for the opportunities of many men, by, for example, 
decreasing their opportunities for good parenting or for jobs that require 
caregiving. However, the impairment itself is functional because if these 
men valued the closed-off ways of living, the stereotypes and norms of 
patriarchy would be threatened. If, for example, caregiving and being in 
close, vulnerable-making relationships were considered especially valua-
ble, then it may no longer seem so plausible to insist that it is the rational 
and self-sufficient male who should be entrusted with leadership roles 
and with highly rewarded business, engineering and scientific positions, 
while being relieved of domestic caregiving.
To put it another way, patriarchy in the US encourages many men to 
value something like “rugged individualism,”12 and in turn this leads to a 
devaluation of vulnerability, interdependence, and community. Consider 
how this may also apply to white privilege. Whites and the economi-
cally advantaged may be more likely to value individualism; it protects 
their privileged positions by contributing to an ideology that justifies 
limited government and emphasizes the importance of individual choice 
in achievement.13 This commitment would then also imply, similar to 
the case of male privilege, a devaluing of interdependence, solidarity, 
and community; we could say that whites become evaluatively impaired 
in that many of them will struggle to appreciate a society that places 
greater emphasis on community and on collective efforts to ameliorate 
social inequalities and less emphasis on individualism.
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8.2.3 Emotional Impairment
Privilege can have a damaging effect on emotions and their regulation. 
The notions of white fragility and the emotional maladaptation associ-
ated with many men in patriarchy provide instructive illustrations of this 
impairment.
Robin DiAngelo (2018, 2011) argues that, in certain ways, whites in 
the US are “fragile.” Among other effects, fragility means that they react 
in an exaggerated and uncontrolled emotional way to certain kinds of 
stressors related to their privilege, such as discussions about the preva-
lence of racism and indeed, the privileges of whiteness:
We perceive any attempt to connect us to the system of racism as 
an unsettling and unfair moral offence. The smallest amount of 
racial stress is intolerable—the mere suggestion that being white 
has meaning often triggers a range of defensive responses. These 
include emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt and behaviors such 
as argumentation, silence, and withdrawal from the stress inducing 
situation.
(DiAngelo 2018, 26)
Part of the reason for this fragility is that whites are used to racial com-
fort— they are used to not having to think about race, racial injustice, 
or their place in the world. When that comfort is threatened, they often 
do not have the psychological stamina to cope and tend to break down 
easily. While fragility might be described as merely a consequence of 
white privilege, the associated emotions and behaviors have functional 
components: “These responses work to reinstate white equilibrium as 
they repel the challenge, return our racial comfort, and maintain our 
dominance within the racial hierarchy” (DiAngelo 2018, 26).
Looking at patriarchal norms of masculinity provides us with illus-
trations of other kinds of emotional impairment. For example, many 
men have been socialized in ways that restrict their emotional range and 
the expression of emotions, as is apparent in the everyday (but rather 
old-fashioned) idea that “boys don’t cry.” When these men aim to live up 
to these stereotypes, the repression of emotion may be a consequence, 
and when they cannot live up to them, feelings of a failure to be a “real 
man” may follow. Emotional repression and feelings of failure of this 
kind have been surmised to contribute to destructive emotional out-
bursts and violence (e.g. Miles 1991).
Emotional impairments often have a functional role in preserving 
patriarchal oppression. If, according to a patriarchal imaginary, one 
needs to be hyper-rational, hyper-independent, and to be able to tran-
scend one’s biology, in order to occupy significant social roles such 
as leadership positions, then men need to live up to these stereotypes 
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to deserve their privileged positions. In this way, while the lack of 
emotional range and the restriction of emotional expression are dam-
aging, they also function to help justify and maintain many men’s 
dominant positions; in other words, there’s a way that being emotion-
ally impaired seems to be a necessary part of what it means to be a 
privileged male.
In claiming that the emotional life of the privileged can be damaged 
by the social system in which they live, I am not claiming that privi-
lege cannot also have a positive impact for emotions, nor am I denying 
the reality of how injustice negatively affects the emotional life of the 
oppressed.14 Thus, for example, I am not claiming that being white can 
lead to emotional “fragility” but being an oppressed person of color 
will not; indeed, of course it is the emotional vulnerability and distress 
of being oppressed that should be our primary concern. This is true of 
many of the other impairments as well—injustice can negatively affect 
the privileged along with the grievous and substantial harm it does to 
the oppressed along similar dimensions.
8.2.4 Health-related
While most indicators of well-being work to the advantage of the privi-
leged, there are some indicators that do not and these have a social basis, 
meaning that the way in which society is organized influences these indi-
cators. An example is the health of many men where this is indicated by 
life expectancy. All other things being equal, men tend to have shorter life 
expectancies than women worldwide.15 While some part of this appears 
to be biological, there are also social components—e.g. men are more 
likely to do hazardous jobs and to make risky lifestyle decisions (see 
e.g. Oksuzyan, Juel, Vaupel, and Christensen 2008; Stanistreet, Bambra, 
and Scott-Samuel 2005; Waldron and Johnston 1976).16 In times of war, 
this influence on life expectancy can be dramatic as usually men, not 
women, are conscripted to fight.
Notice that this is a significant and constitutive component of men’s 
positioning in a patriarchal society—if the stereotypes are that men 
are strong, autonomous, and competent, whereas women are weaker, 
then certain social expectations are likely to follow, e.g. men need to 
be entrusted with more hazardous jobs. This kind of impairment—and 
many others—are a consequence of aspects of the unjust society that are 
set up to favor many men. While the health-related impairments are con-
sequences of privilege, they are consequences of functional stereotypes 
that are required for the unjust social system to operate.
There is a correlate here for race. While people of color suffer a much 
greater burden of disease due to the health and healthcare dispari-
ties associated with structural racism and socioeconomic injustices—
COVID-19 is only the latest disease to disproportionately affect people 
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of color (Subbaraman 2020)—research is indicating that “whiteness” is 
also a contributing factor to the poor health of many white Americans. 
Metzl (2019) has argued that increasingly mainstream conservative 
political movements that fuel white racial resentment, and are often 
supported by lower- and middle-class whites, are encouraging poli-
cies—such as pro-gun legislation and the dismantling of the Affordable 
Care Act—that have a severe negative impact on the health of their 
white supporters. Metzl claims that these whites, who are partially 
motivated to support conservative movements in order to maintain their 
position in a racial hierarchy, are “dying of whiteness” (9 [his empha-
sis]). In other words, they insist on maintaining “the wages of white-
ness,”17 even though the policies associated with these “wages” are also 
harmful to them.
8.2.5 Affiliative Impairment
Privilege can also impair certain kinds of significant relationships. As a 
first example, consider patriarchal norms which can increase the likeli-
hood that a man will not be able to have a close, caring relationship with 
his children, or be able to have a fulfilling relationship of equals with a 
female spouse. Think too of the ways in which certain kinds of expecta-
tions of masculinity influence the relationships between many men and 
how it might determine and constrain how supportive and caring those 
relationships are likely to be.18
A second example relates to colonialism. One of the critiques of a 
colonial mentality from indigenous scholars in North America has been 
that it has created problematic relationships between humans, on the 
one hand, and the land and non-human animals, on the other (Whyte 
2017). When a colonial mentality demands seeing land as primarily a 
scarce resource over which people compete for use, this tends to make 
difficult, or even impossible, certain kinds of closer and more mutually 
beneficial relationships with the land and with animals.
Affiliative impairment seems to follow particularly from certain func-
tional conceptions of the self which are associated with privilege. White 
people and many men are often portrayed as “autonomous”—this is 
part of their supposed superiority—but this is a problematic form of 
liberal autonomy that is asocial and hyper-independent, standing in the 
way of the formation of certain kinds of caring relationships. The ways 
in which the autonomy of the privileged has been formulated relies on 
a mythical atomistic or rugged individualism, which emphasizes self-in-
terested rationality and ignores the ways in which the privileged are 
dependent, vulnerable and shaped by social relationships. Feminist the-
ories of relational autonomy have done much to identify and reject these 
problematic notions of autonomy (e.g. Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000, 5–12; 
Sherwin 2012).
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8.2.6 Moral Impairment
Being privileged also makes moral impairment more likely. While it is 
possible to be privileged and to fulfill moral duties, being privileged risks 
an increase in moral failings. For example, the privileged will be less 
motivated to fight injustice and create just institutions (for such duties, 
see e.g. Rawls 1999, 98–101) than to maintain the status quo. Research 
has also shown that individuals belonging to a higher socioeconomic 
class tend to be more focused on themselves whereas those belonging to 
a lower class are more likely to pay attention to and be generous to oth-
ers, e.g. the rich give proportionally less to charity than those who are 
poorer (Koenig 2015; Piff and Robinson 2017; Piff et al. 2010). Piff and 
Robinson (2017) claim that individuals of higher classes tend to be more 
self-oriented, and this is encouraged by having “greater control and free-
dom of choice…, reduced vulnerability to threats…, and an emphasis 
on individualism and personal accomplishment” (6). In contrast, lower 
class individuals tend to be more empathetic and cooperative (6–7).
Furthermore, epistemic ignorance is likely to lead to moral impair-
ment. For example, self-ignorance might lead to arrogance, exaggerated 
self-confidence and feelings of moral superiority. If, for example, privi-
leged people believe they are better off due to hard work or innate tal-
ents, rather than due to inherited social position, this could lead to a 
heightened and false sense of self-worth and moral standing. Consider, 
for example, Frye (1992, 152–158) on how white privilege influenced 
her, including inspiring her to feel morally superior with a duty to teach 
others—poor people and people of color—how to be better people.
8.3  Distributive Egalitarianism and the 
Impairments of Privilege
The notion that the privileged are damaged by privilege is not new, but it 
has not been considered in-depth by theories of justice. In this section, I 
identify two broad conceptions of egalitarianism—distributive and rela-
tional egalitarianism—in order to assess their theoretical resources for 
incorporating the impairments of privilege into a theory of justice.
Distributive justice requires that we implement a fair pattern of dis-
tribution of the relevant metric(s) of justice. For distributive egalitari-
anism, a fair pattern is an equal one. For example, justice could require 
the equal distribution of resources such as income, or it could require 
equality of opportunity for resources, allowing for inequalities in the 
actual resources themselves.19 Relational egalitarianism is often con-
trasted to distributive egalitarianism. For both forms of egalitarianism, 
equality has moral value. However, whereas distributive theorists are 
concerned with the value of equality as a pattern of distribution, rela-
tional egalitarians maintain that morally valuable equality is foremost 
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a matter of people regarding and treating one another as equals (Miller 
1997, 224).20 Relational egalitarians may take a stand on patterns of 
distribution; for example, Anderson (1999, 2010a) appears to endorse 
sufficiency of capabilities as the pattern required by relational equal-
ity. However, relational egalitarians do not reduce social justice to the 
fair pattern of distributions, insisting that relationships of equals are 
at least as important, if not more so.21 In this section, I will argue that 
the impairments of privilege pose a problem for distributive egalitarian-
ism, and in the next, I will demonstrate that relational egalitarianism, 
in contrast, has the theoretical resources to identify the impairments of 
privilege and the injustices underlying them.
The general argument of this section is as follows: I first show that the 
impairments of privilege will influence the distribution of the resources 
significant to justice. However, distributive egalitarianism is unlikely to 
identify the role that the impairments of privilege play. In particular, 
this form of egalitarianism will have an inadequate response to the dis-
tribution of resources due to the impairments of privilege: it will either 
advocate the redistribution of a troubling resource, or it will wrongly 
claim that the troubling status quo is just. In both cases injustice will be 
reinforced.22
I develop this argument using an example—the social basis of self-re-
spect under patriarchy. Consider a Rawlsian notion of self-respect:
it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction 
that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying 
out. And second, self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so 
far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.
(Rawls 1999, 386)
We cannot distribute self-respect directly; thus, it is the social basis of 
self-respect that is considered to be the distributive good. Rawls has 
described this as “perhaps the most important primary good” (386).
Under patriarchy, all other things being equal, many men are more 
likely to have greater self-respect than women. Women are likely to 
have a lower sense of their own value and believe that many of their 
life plans—menial or low-paid jobs, marriage, overseeing the house-
hold—are not as significant as men’s. While motherhood tends to be 
highly valued, it is expected that women will fulfill it by virtue of being 
a woman; and men are often treated as the ultimate authority in the 
household. Women are also less likely to have the confidence in them-
selves that many men have. Among the reasons for this deficit could 
be the internalization of the norms and expectations of patriarchy and 
the lack of opportunities to gain positions of power and status that 
would boost women’s sense of self-worth and their esteem in the eyes 
of others.
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Aiming to diagnose this injustice, distributive egalitarians could say 
that men have more of the social basis of self-respect than women do, all 
other things being equal, and that this inequality is unfair because it has 
not been chosen by women. As egalitarians, they value equality; thus, 
pro tanto, flattening the inequality would be better than maintaining 
it. Equality could be achieved by leveling up (women receive more of 
the social bases of self-respect) or leveling down (men receive less), or a 
combination of the two (men receive less and women receive more). As 
pluralists, all things considered, distributive egalitarians are unlikely to 
prescribe leveling down, even if they value the equality that it brings; 
rather leveling up or, at least, a combination of the two, is likely to be 
prescribed in order to achieve equality.23
However, the distributivist’s recommendation to level up (or to pro-
mote a combination) will in effect promote the injustices underlying the 
impairments of privilege. For instance, the distributivist’s response will 
recommend that women be provided the basis for a kind of self-respect 
that is available to (many) men. Yet this so-called self-respect is partially 
the result of impairment. Patriarchal oppression allows many men to 
have a false sense of confidence, and to falsely believe that they, and their 
plans of life, are particularly valuable. Not only do they falsely believe 
that their plans of life are more valuable, but, due to emotional, affilia-
tive, and evaluative impairment, they are often encouraged to act as if 
they are emotionally invulnerable and self-sufficient, and to value these 
as superior ways of acting. Furthermore, they are often willfully igno-
rant of the reality of the social order and its injustice, and in turn how 
this impacts their sense of self and identity. How respect and self-respect 
are garnered then is dependent on the distortions of impairments. That 
is to say, the ignorance, invulnerability, and over-confidence associated 
with impairments of privilege become the basis for a certain attitude 
that is likely to boost self-respect and the conviction one’s conceptions 
of the good are particularly important. Many men are thus provided 
with more of the social basis of self-respect than women, but these 
men’s self-respect is partially due to their ignorance of gender injustice, 
to mythical worldviews that consider them superior, and to the valuing 
of rugged individualism and its associated notions of autonomy.
To illustrate the problem for distributivists, take Sheryl Sandberg’s 
(2015) notion of “leaning in,” which encourages women to “play the 
corporate game more deftly” (McRobbie in Rottenberg 2014a, 427).24 A 
major component of Sandberg’s claims is that women are holding them-
selves back in the workplace by lacking confidence and belief in them-
selves, and by acting in ways that will help them to be liked rather than 
to achieve success. Sandberg claims that whereas women often underes-
timate their skills and abilities, men often believe they are doing better 
than they really are, which is one of the factors that helps some men 
to succeed because they think they merit highly rewarded positions of 
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power. Among the numerous feminist criticisms of Sandberg’s approach 
is that she neglects the major structural barriers that keep women from 
achieving valuable social positions. Women, so the criticism goes, are 
prevented from highly rewarded social positions because they are denied 
fair equality of opportunity in obtaining these positions, for example, by 
expectations that they are the primary caregivers in a family, and thus 
unable to devote enough time to career advancement. Sandberg ignores 
these structural barriers to fair equality of opportunity.
However, for the purposes of this argument, let us say Sandberg is 
correct that the advancement of women in the workplace is also sub-
ject to psychological barriers such as a lack of self-confidence or self-re-
spect. Their deficit in the social basis of self-respect is then in and of 
itself a problem of justice, along with the other structural barriers to 
opportunities.
From a distributive perspective, part of what it would mean to achieve 
justice would be to increase women’s access to the social basis of 
self-respect. This would encourage them to act more self-confidently 
than they feel, to bluff when necessary, to be outspoken, and to aggres-
sively self-promote. This distributive response could be described as a 
case of trying to level up—we want women to have the resources (includ-
ing publicly funded “lean-in” training?) necessary to access the height-
ened self-respect that many men have in business. However, trying to 
create equality in this way misses a fundamental problem—these men 
have a form of self-respect that is based on a fake sense of desert and 
superiority, and on a problematic notion of autonomy, that is inculcated 
via patriarchal gender norms and expectations. Hence, the first option 
open to distributive egalitarianism is troubling; it would encourage 
women to adopt a flawed masculine form of self-respect, only reinforc-
ing patriarchal notions of gender.
A second option for the distributivist would acknowledge the above 
criticism and concede that many men have sham self-respect. The 
Rawlsian approach demands that the social basis of self-respect will 
promote a secure conviction that one’s conception of the good is worth 
carrying out. When men have self-respect through an inflated sense of 
self and a belief in mythical worldviews—as described by epistemic 
impairment—they arguably do not have this secure conviction. In other 
words, men might not actually have (much) more of the social basis of 
self-respect than women do. This response seems, prima facie, to pro-
vide an acceptable diagnosis of the implications of the impairments of 
privilege.
My worry about this second response is twofold. First, it is unclear 
whether distributive egalitarianism has the theoretical resources to 
identify men’s sham self-respect. In order to identify the flaws in 
the social basis of men’s self-respect, we would have to articulate 
the patriarchal values, norms, stereotypes and expectations that 
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underlie the distribution, and it is not clear how this could be done 
from within a distributive framework.25 Second, even if distributiv-
ism were able to identify the problem, it would then have to claim 
that there is greater equality between men and women, other things 
being equal, than we initially supposed. This distributive equality is, 
pro tanto, a good thing. The response implies therefore that under 
patriarchy, neither men nor women have much of the social basis of 
self-respect, and thus there is distributive equality. This conclusion 
ignores the problem I identify in this chapter, namely that the under-
lying injustice remains despite the distributive equality—patriarchy 
creates masculinities and femininities and does so in a way that sub-
ordinates and egregiously harms women, and also, in lesser ways, 
damages privileged men.
Two further problematic consequences could ensue from this second 
response. First, the distributive egalitarian could actually prescribe solu-
tions that would impair many men (further) when these would result 
in greater distributive equality. For example, providing men with more 
false notions of their importance might seem like leveling down, “leve-
ling” the social basis of self-respect, and thus creating greater equality 
between men and women in terms of genuine self-respect, by providing 
men with even more of a rocky basis for self-respect. In this case then, 
levelling down can be seen as a valuable option: men are provided with 
more sham self-respect in order to undermine the access they have to 
authentic forms of self-respect. However, in the process, we would be 
reinforcing men’s impairment as well as the morally problematic gender 
norms underlying the impairment. Second, if the kinds of impairments 
that distributive egalitarians value or prescribe for the sake of equality 
are functional, then levelling down in this case might mean that injustice 
is only further entrenched. As a reminder, functional impairment pro-
tects the privileged and the unjust system that makes them privileged. 
Giving men even more of a false sense of their own self-worth, even if it 
is ultimately a sham, may only entrench a sense of deserving privilege, 
especially if epistemic impairment has been reinforced. Thus, this sec-
ond distributive response could reinforce the protection the privileged 
receive from functional impairments, potentially making it even harder 
to achieve justice.
While I have focused only on one distributive good, the social basis of 
self-respect, and one kind of theory of distributive justice, I believe my 
criticism applies much more broadly. If we measured justice according to 
welfare, for example, impairments of privilege could be judged to create 
greater equality between men and women, all other things being equal, 
as men’s welfare would be diminished by the impairments of privilege.26 
The gendered injustices underlying the impairments of privilege would 
go unnoticed if we used the distribution of aggregate welfare as a basis 
for assessing justice.
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In short, an emphasis on distribution misses an important qualita-
tive aspect of the social goods that are impacted by oppression and the 
impairments of privilege. The influence of patriarchy on the social basis 
of self-respect, and of other goods, should not be thought of purely 
quantitatively—it is the content of self-respect and other goods, and the 
underlying gendered mechanisms that contribute to their construction, 
that are significant. The focus of theories of equality therefore should 
be on analyzing the intertwining oppressive relationships between 
the privileged and the oppressed. This is where we turn to relational 
egalitarianism.
8.4 Privilege as Relational and the Egalitarian Ethos
How might relational egalitarians recognize and respond to the impair-
ments of privilege? An investigation of these impairments highlights two 
broad benefits of relational egalitarianism as a theory of justice. First, it 
indicates that relational egalitarianism has an advantage over distribu-
tive egalitarianism: it has the explanatory power to provide a conception 
of privilege that makes visible the impairments of privilege and the injus-
tices underlying them. The first part of this section explains the concep-
tion of privilege offered by relational egalitarianism. This conception 
recognizes how the privileged are shaped by their social standing and 
their relationship with the oppressed. The second part then outlines a 
further benefit of relational egalitarianism: uncovering and assessing the 
specifics of the impairments of privilege helps to illustrate the require-
ments of a society of equals.
Relational egalitarians are often particularly interested in identifying 
certain kinds of unequal relationships as antithetical to justice. A pri-
mary form of inequality ruled out by relational egalitarianism is the 
hierarchical relationship between those treated as inferior and those 
treated as superior (see e.g. Anderson 1999). Many contemporary modes 
of oppression are paradigms of this kind of problematic relationship. 
Positions in an oppressive hierarchy are shaped in relation to each other; 
in other words, one’s position in a hierarchy is characterized by and 
dependent on the positions of others. For the relational egalitarian, priv-
ilege will be defined relationally; it is necessarily connected to social 
position in a hierarchy, and the delineation of privilege depends on its 
contrast to the oppressed group, as well as on the purpose of the hier-
archical relationship. For example, male privilege is defined in relation 
to the social position of male superiority, and this is defined in relation 
to female inferiority. This interdependence in characterizing the ranks 
of the hierarchy is not a side-effect of injustice; the interdependent rela-
tionship helps constitute the unjust social system and its manifestation in 
formal social structure, such as regulations, and informal social norms, 
stereotypes, and expectations.
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Understanding injustice in this way provides a framework that can 
recognize and respond to the impairments of privilege; they can be 
understood as functional for or consequences of the social hierarchy. 
For example, the problematic content of men’s self-respect that was 
described in the previous section is a result of men’s position in an unjust 
hierarchy. Many men develop impairments of privilege because they 
occupy the social role associated with male privilege—they are expected 
to value and enact traits that are gendered as masculine and in so 
doing they become emotionally, affiliatively, and evaluatively impaired. 
Furthermore, they must be epistemically ignorant so as to believe in their 
superiority and their place in the social order.
For the relational egalitarian, the solution to injustice requires chang-
ing the nature of relationships by creating new relationships of equals 
and abolishing social hierarchies. This contrasts with the options open 
to distributive egalitarianism, namely providing the oppressed with what 
the privileged have, or taking away what the privileged have, to achieve 
an equal distribution. Relational equality requires that the system be 
reformed to eradicate the oppressive relationships that shape men and 
women’s self-respect, and to achieve a healthier and more secure self-re-
spect that is not sustained by mythical worldviews, ignorance about gen-
der injustice, blurred self-knowledge, and the over-valuation of rugged 
individualism.
Consider again the notion of “leaning in” discussed in the previous 
section. A distributive approach may aim to increase women’s access to 
the social basis of the heightened self-respect that men are more likely 
to feel in business. In so doing, it would ignore the problems of a corpo-
rate masculinity—an impaired masculinity—that embraces an individ-
ualistic notion of a self which has exaggerated, asocial independence. 
However, a relational egalitarian approach has the theoretical resources 
to reject this kind of redistribution because it replicates a system that 
constructs masculinities and femininities relationally, favoring the mas-
culine, and denigrating the feminine, while making non-binary options 
invisible. Relational egalitarians can insist that these interdependent 
masculinities and femininities, and how they confer advantage, need to 
be overhauled because they are based on unjust social hierarchies.
Relational egalitarianism therefore has more explanatory power than 
distributive egalitarianism. This explanatory power relies on its under-
standing of the notion of privilege. Privilege needs to be defined relation-
ally according to social standing in a hierarchy; it should not be defined 
primarily or exclusively as being better off in terms of resources to be 
distributed independently of social standing. Thus, the initial under-
standing of privilege advanced in the first section—that being privileged 
can be defined as being better off distributively—can be rejected.
Moreover, analyzing privilege as related to position in an unjust social 
hierarchy has implications for how we should conceive of a society of 
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equals and identify the characteristics of an egalitarian ethos. A soci-
ety of equals requires an egalitarian ethos—a set of egalitarian values 
translated into social norms, competencies, and virtues that can be used 
to assess and motivate attitudes and behavior that reflect, promote, or 
reinforce relational equality.27 In the last part of this section, I will iden-
tify three ways in which a relational conception of the impairments of 
privilege promotes the development and content of such an ethos. In 
Section 8.4.1, the relational conception addresses the causes of func-
tional impairments of privilege which serve to protect unjust hierarchies, 
in Section 8.4.2, it expresses respect for the oppressed, and in Section 
8.4.3, it minimizes positional competitiveness. The first two considera-
tions apply primarily to an unjust society, and thus they are particularly 
relevant to the process of achieving a society of equals. The third is rele-
vant even to a society that has rid itself of the most significant injustices.
8.4.1  Moral Priority for Addressing the Causes 
of Functional Impairments
Functional impairments are protective. Recall that epistemic impair-
ments can protect the privileged by justifying their position in the 
hierarchy, thus leading them to resist change to the system. Functional 
impairments that are protective of the unjust system should be accorded 
an urgent ethical status. While we should not prioritize addressing 
the impairments of privilege for their own sake, we should care that 
certain kinds of impairments and their causes hamper the combatting 
of injustice and undermine an egalitarian ethos. Thus, eliminating or 
rehabilitating protective factors should have a high moral priority for 
instrumental reasons. Social factors such as those that keep the epis-
temic ignorance of the privileged in place are particularly ethically prob-
lematic and are important to combat precisely because of their protective 
role. Challenging these protective factors is thus a means for helping to 
develop an egalitarian ethos. We can describe such an ethos as one that 
will encourage epistemic competence about privilege, inequality, and 
injustice. One way this might be practically achieved is through deseg-
regation of a racially segregated society. Segregation can contribute to 
epistemic ignorance by shielding the privileged from exposure to diver-
sity and to the ways in which the disadvantaged have to live.28 Another 
practical strategy would be to promote the role of the state to counteract 
messages propagated by the media that advantage and disadvantage are 
primarily based on desert or merit.
It can be challenging to make these changes as the privileged are likely 
to resist them precisely because of their epistemic impairment and their 
vast over-representation in political power. The priority to combat func-
tional impairments that are protective of injustice might therefore have 
to be taken up by grassroots movements. In setting priorities, activists 
BK-TandF-VOIGT_9780367416898-211028-Chp08.indd   184 30/08/21   5:43 PM
How Being Better Off Is Bad for You 185
may need to orient their resistance towards protective factors, especially 
where policy-makers do not seem willing to change them.
8.4.2 Expressing Respect for the Oppressed
One of the primary features of oppression is the violation of respect-
for-persons (or recognition) suffered by the oppressed.29 Developing an 
egalitarian ethos will put emphasis on state policies and social norms 
that respect those who are disadvantaged—for example, those who have 
less direct political power. Acknowledging the impairments of privilege 
will help to advance this aspect of the egalitarian ethos. When we do not 
recognize how an unjust system can warp the privileged, we are in greater 
danger of explaining injustice in a way that insults the oppressed. For 
example, dismissing the choices of the oppressed—where those choices 
uphold their oppression—as merely conditioned is disrespectful and cre-
ates the impression that the oppressed cannot be autonomous.30 While 
our responses to the danger of disrespecting the oppressed needs to be 
multifold, they should at least emphasize that the decision-making of the 
privileged is also adaptive to the circumstances of injustice. The priv-
ileged also make decisions according to the stereotypes, expectations, 
and social norms of unjust systems, and, like those of the oppressed, 
their choices are socially conditioned. Furthermore, the privileged often 
make decisions that are ignorant and damaging to themselves. Thus, 
when we recognize that unjust hierarchies generate impairments of 
privilege, we will avoid pathologizing the experiences of the oppressed 
and normalizing the experiences of the privileged. This will advance an 
egalitarian ethos of respect-for-persons, as it will counter the troubling 
idea that the values and experiences of the privileged are neutral or even 
positive whereas those of the oppressed are “other,” conditioned, non-
autonomous, or deviant.31
8.4.3 Minimizing Positional Competitiveness
A society of equals is antithetical to hierarchies of superiors and infe-
riors. Historically, these kinds of inegalitarian relationships have been 
explicitly endorsed, with claims made directly that men are superior to 
women, whites to people of color, and so on. Although these explicit 
claims are now much less common, forms of treatment that imply supe-
riority and inferiority among social groups remain,32 and these need to 
be combatted in order to achieve a society of equals. While it will be 
greeted as self-evident that treating people as superior or inferior on 
the basis of being white or male is morally wrong, there are two signifi-
cant and much less evident implications of this discussion for relational 
equality.
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First, a relational egalitarianism that recognizes the relationality of 
privilege, and thus is able to respond to the impairments of privilege, 
can show us that injustice is bad not only for the worse off in society, or 
even for society as a whole, it can also be bad for those who are better 
off. This provides a supplementary justification for relational egalitari-
anism. Second, an egalitarian ethos should minimize what are normally 
considered to be uncontroversial ways in which people are treated as 
superior or “better.” Specifically, an egalitarian ethos which recognizes 
the impairments of privilege will encourage the reduction of positional 
competitiveness.
Consider the discussion of positional goods in the literature on dis-
tributive justice: “A positional good is one which a person values only on 
condition that not everyone has it. Prizes, for instance, are worthless, if 
shelled out to all, and much of what we seek has this exclusive charac-
ter” (Hollis 1984, 97). While positional goods are not necessarily always 
morally problematic, a society of equals would minimize competition for 
positional goods, or at least minimize the social value of those goods, or 
more likely, do both.33 This is because increased competitions for posi-
tional goods or an increased value for such goods, or both, undermine 
how much individuals are able to reasonably feel that they are equals. 
Scanlon (2003, 204) makes the following point about the influence of 
material inequality on a society of equals: “those who are much worse 
off will feel inferiority and shame.” This could also apply to competi-
tive societies where there must be winners and losers.34 And, from the 
perspective of the impairments of privilege, we can surmise that even 
the winners are likely to be damaged—for example, those at the top 
are likely to experience anxiety, isolation, and lack of affiliation due to 
the frequent demands to prove themselves better than others. Relational 
equality under such circumstances may be undermined.
An example is schooling for children—a more egalitarian society, pro 
tanto, would lean towards fewer interpersonal competitions and fewer 
occasions in which students are ranked according to abilities and skills.35 
Additionally, when there are competitions and rankings, the rewards 
associated with these would not be particularly high. Early education 
may be a particularly significant domain in which to minimize competi-
tiveness because it could have a strong influence on a child’s development 
and her understanding of how the world works. An egalitarian ethos 
would therefore be likely to emphasize modesty, solidarity, collabora-
tion, and social trust and minimize the importance of competitiveness 
and personal reward. We value this ethos primarily because without it, 
the worse off would be made to feel inferior, and reasonably so, thus vio-
lating relational equality. However, it is interesting that the egalitarian 
ethos will also eradicate the impairments experienced by the better off. 
The relationality of privilege helps us to recognize this point.
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My aim in this section has been to emphasize that recognition of the 
impairments of privilege has implications for the articulation of an egal-
itarian ethos. Much needs to be further explained.36 I recognize that 
the concern with competitive positionality needs elaboration which is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. I also do not consider the three aspects 
of an egalitarian ethos that I have identified here to be the only impli-
cations. The impairments of privilege are likely to require direct inter-
vention, including distributive solutions. We may need to improve men’s 
capabilities for affiliation and emotional connections explicitly via a bet-
ter distribution of relationship goods or relational capital,37 for example, 
by implementing Behrends and Schouten’s (2017) suggestion that boys 
(only) should receive mandatory home economics instruction that pro-
motes caregiving.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the literature on injustice by identifying and 
delineating what I termed “impairments of privilege,” a topic that has 
not yet received much attention. Using the example of the social basis of 
self-respect under patriarchy, I argued that distributivists would struggle 
to diagnose the underlying system of injustice that warps many men’s 
self-respect. In contrast, relational egalitarianism has the resources to 
make visible the impairments of privilege and the injustices underlying 
them because it delineates privilege as relational within a social hierar-
chy. Additionally, assessing the impairments of privilege through rela-
tional egalitarianism helps us to characterize how to achieve a society of 
equals: we must address the causes of functional impairments, express 
respect for the worse off by not normalizing the experiences of the priv-
ileged, and minimize competitive positionality. The chapter is explan-
atory in the sense that it identifies a phenomenon—the impairments of 
privilege—and argues that relational egalitarianism provides the best 
framework to fully explicate this phenomenon. However, the argument 
also has implications for the normative justification of relational egali-
tarianism. Not only do we clearly need relational equality for the sake 
of the worse off, it will also be beneficial for the better off to avoid the 
impairments of privilege associated with their superior position in unjust 
social hierarchies.38
Notes
 1. For historical examples, consider Hegel on how the “master” in the mas-
ter/slave dialectic becomes dehumanized, “idle and unproductive, com-
fortable in mere consumption,” and trapped (Bulhan 1985, 102–106), and 
Matthew Arnold on how inequality harms those who are better off “by 
pampering” (Tawney 1964, 1).
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 2. Consider, for example, McKinnon and Sennet’s (2017) distinctions 
between entitlement-, advantage- and benefit-privileges.
 3. Among the reasons I focus on these two forms of injustice is because of my 
own positionality—as a white woman, I have experienced (white) patriar-
chy. As a white woman, I have white privilege.
 4. For an influential description of patriarchy, see Hartmann (1979), and 
more recently on patriarchy and misogyny, Manne (2017). For an influen-
tial description of white privilege, see McIntosh (1989), and for a recent 
criticism of the discourse of “white privilege” as applied to racial profiling, 
see Zack (2015). For the influence of white supremacy on the US in the 
post-civil rights era, see Bonilla-Silva (2001).
 5. Gender injustice is not only experienced by women. In this paper, women 
can refer to both cisgender and transgender women. However, transgender 
and nonbinary people experience multiple gender injustices under patri-
archy that cannot be captured by the injustices experienced by women. 
Furthermore, sexuality is also a major site of oppression under the heter-
onormativity of patriarchy. See, for example, Butler (1997) and Bettcher 
and Garry (2009).
 6. See Cudd (2006) and Young (2011) for understandings of oppression.
 7. I thank Cody Dout for emphasizing this point. See also Curry (2017).
 8. I thank Sara Goering for helping me to formulate this point. Am I not 
referring to white men only when I refer to male privilege? I believe that 
would go too far in the other direction. I am not convinced that some of 
the privileges I refer to are so narrowly spread, even if in some cases they 
may be. Furthermore, some white men, such as gay men or working-class 
men, will be excluded from some of the privileges of being male, as well 
as the impairments I describe. While I cannot assess all forms of privilege 
and oppression, it is important to recognize that impairments of privilege 
will only be relevant according to particular forms and intersections of 
oppression.
 9. I preliminarily identified impairments associated with privilege in an 
earlier paper on social-relational equality (Fourie 2012, 118–120). Here 
I build on and revise those preliminary claims. This is not intended to 
be a comprehensive list of impairments; indeed, the dehumanization of 
the privileged mentioned in the introduction does not seem to be cov-
ered by these categories, thus further categories need to be identified and 
explicated.
 10. A correlate then of the idea that the privileged are impaired by privilege, 
is that in certain ways the oppressed have advantages over the privileged, 
e.g. in this case, on average, they have better knowledge of self and the 
social order. Medina (2012), for example, identifies three epistemic virtues 
of the oppressed. This is not to deny that the oppressed often internal-
ize their oppression which can have a negative impact on their epistemic 
standpoint, among other influences; see, for example, Lorde (2012) on this 
internalization.
 11. This does not mean that they should not be held accountable for their 
ignorance, however. Consider the notions of active (Medina 2012) and 
willful ignorance (Pohlhaus 2012) which help explain the moral responsi-
bility of the privileged for their ignorance. Pohlhaus argues that the priv-
ileged often refuse to acquire the epistemic resources that will undermine 
their ignorance because they are invested in that ignorance and its coordi-
nation among other privileged people.
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 12. Rugged individualism includes a commitment to “a view of the self as 
independent rather than interdependent, the emphasis on self-reliance, the 
primacy of self-interest, and the regulation of behavior by personal atti-
tudes rather than social norms” (Bazzi et al. 2017, 5).
 13. See, for example, Jackman and Muha on how “dominant social groups 
routinely develop ideologies that legitimize and justify the status quo” 
(Jackman and Muha 1984, 751) and the influence of individualism par-
ticularly (Jackman and Muha 1984; Jackman 1996). See also Eppard et al. 
(2020) on individualism and economic advantage.
 14. For some of the very harmful effects of discrimination and oppression on 
emotions and their regulation for the oppressed, see Fourie (2018).
 15. This does not necessarily mean that women are advantaged in terms of 
health. Women’s morbidity tends to be higher than men’s and, indeed, that 
they live longer in worse health may be a relative disadvantage in compar-
ison to men’s shorter life expectancy (e.g. Luy and Minagawa 2014).
 16. Social differences in life expectancy between men and women should defi-
nitely not be seen exclusively as a consequence of patriarchy. In the case 
of African-American men, their much shorter average life expectancy in 
comparison to whites, and women, including Black women, is due primar-
ily to the compounded injustice they experience in virtue of being Black 
men in an oppressive society; for example, they experience an increased 
likelihood of being killed in a homicide (see e.g. Bond and Herman 2016).
 17. See Roediger (2007), and the original influential idea of compensation for 
being white from Du Bois (1932).
 18. I discussed similar concerns under “evaluative impairment” but note the 
distinction between these impairments. Affiliative impairment is directly 
about damage to relationships. Evaluative impairment is about damage 
to what is valued. Of course, the devaluing of relationships and of a rich 
emotional life are likely to influence the development of affiliative and 
emotional impairment, but they remain analytically distinct.
 19. For a useful description and illustration of patterns and metrics of justice, 
see Anderson (2010a).
 20. Additionally, see, for example, Anderson (1999), the various authors in 
Fourie, Schuppert, and Wallimann-Helmer (2015), and Scanlon (2018).
 21. The distinction drawn helps illustrate these theories; I am not claiming 
that relationism and distributivism are necessarily incompatible. See, for 
example, Lippert-Rasmussen (2018) for an approach that combines rela-
tional and luck egalitarianism. A distributive theory that is susceptible to 
my critique may be able to avoid my concerns if it is compatible with, and 
can be coherently combined with, relational egalitarianism.
 22. While I focus on distributive egalitarianism and I do not have the scope to 
consider other patterns of distribution here, I believe that prioritarian, suf-
ficientarian, and maximizing distributive theories would also fail to recog-
nize and address the injustices underlying the impairments of privilege.
 23. Precisely what they will prescribe would depend on which other values or 
patterns of distribution besides equality are required for justice (e.g. maxi-
mizing goods), as well as the priority they give to equality versus the other 
values/patterns. For a description of the problem of levelling down for 
distributive egalitarianism, see Parfit (1997), and for a pluralist egalitarian 
response, see O’Neill (2008).
 24. My assessment in this section and the next is highly influenced by bell 
hooks’ critique of leaning in “Dig Deep: Beyond Lean In.” A significant 
criticism that I do not discuss here but that is important to mention is that 
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Sandberg’s feminism is one that applies primarily to privileged women—
often white, middle-class women (hooks 2013). See also Rottenberg 
(2014a, 2014b) for a critique of Sandberg’s neoliberal “feminism.”
 25. See Young (2011, 15–38, 111–171) on how distributive frameworks adopt 
dominant values.
 26. I thank Kristin Voigt for emphasizing this point.
 27. See, for example, Cohen (2000, 117–147) and Wolff (1998, 2010) for 
descriptions of and justifications for an egalitarian ethos.
 28. I recognize that the oppressed may have reason to prefer segregation, for 
example, to protect them from abuse by the privileged and to promote 
community; however, here I refer to segregation which the oppressed 
would prefer to eliminate. I thank A.Y. Yomi-Odedeyi for emphasizing the 
significance of self-segregation in numerous conversations. For a classic 
text on the harms of segregation, see King Jr. (1968)  and for a more recent 
description, see Anderson (2010b).
 29. See, for example, Darwall (1977) for more on respect-for-persons, and 
Fraser (1996) on recognition and its contrast with distribution.
 30. See, for example, Khader (2011) for the confusions and condescension 
associated with relying on intuitive notions of adaptive preferences to 
understand the choices made by women under patriarchy.
 31. On the oppressed as “the other,” see, for example, Young 2011, 58–61, 
96–155. For a particularly influential discussion of women as “other,” see 
Beauvoir (1949, 3–17).
 32. Consider, for example, Shelby (2018) on how a “problematic” Black cul-
ture is often blamed for the inequalities between white Americans and 
African Americans.
 33. See also Brighouse and Swift’s (2006) suggestion that rather than neces-
sarily distribute positional goods more equally, which may require level-
ling down, we need to break the causal links between certain activities and 
their rewards.
 34. This is clearly a contingent point—I am making assumptions about how 
people would feel in a society that is primarily just, but which places an 
emphasis on competition.
 35. I agree with Scanlon (2003) that a society of equals is likely to require 
pluralism in terms of what it values—the fewer the traits and skills that are 
valued, the more likely individuals are to feel inferior; however, my argu-
ment is that we should also be reducing the competitions for positional 
goods. Even if there is greater pluralism in what we value and even if that 
pluralism is reflected in competitions, I do not believe that a solution to 
relational inequality is to increase competitions to reflect a greater number 
and variety of skills (see Fourie 2015).
 36. Elsewhere, I have described why relational egalitarians should be con-
cerned with inequalities in the positional good of social esteem (Fourie 
2015).
 37. See e.g. Cordelli (2015) on what she refers to as relational resources.
 38. This chapter was challenging to write, and I made slow progress with 
it—besides numerous other challenges, it was written primarily while 
I had a newborn baby, and then while I had no childcare during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Natalie Stoljar and Kristin Voigt received many 
flawed and unclear versions of this chapter. Graciously and patiently, they 
provided detailed and significant comments and suggestions for each ver-
sion, as I slowly built up the argument. I am exceptionally grateful for 
their guidance and for their continued support despite the roughness of 
my drafts. Many thanks also go to Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra and Sara 
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Goering for providing excellent comments that have helped me to improve 
the chapter. Participants in the “Phil Lunch” at the Department of Philos-
ophy, University of Washington, including but not limited to Cody Dout, 
Justin Lawson, Michael Rosenthal, Arthur Obst, and Bill Talbott, pro-
vided beneficial comments at an early stage. I also greatly appreciate Kayla 
Mehl-Hutchinson’s editorial assistance. Last, many thanks to the Benja-
min Rabinowitz Endowment in Medical Ethics and the Royalty Research 
Fund at the University of Washington for generous financial support.
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